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 product * had caused injury, and that plaintiff's allegations 
went to the adequacy of the installation service, but all of 
plaintiff's pretrial allegations and arguments including 
arguments to this Court were based solely on the adequacy of 
Tel Tech's performance of its service contract with Meadow 
Gold—the customized installation of the spray balls." This 
"statement of fact" is pure, unsupported argument. It 
additionally misstates material facts in the record. Carl 
Eilers clearly testified that the spray balls were defective 
and dangerous and that this condition caused plaintiff's 
injury. See Transcript, R. 922 at 32-40; Transcript. R. 922 
at 207; Addendum C to plaintiff's opening brief. 
Defendant's claim in the above-noted footnote that all 
of plaintiff's pretrial allegations and arguments were based 
solely on the performance of its service contract with Meadow 
Gold is also false. After this Court remanded this case for 
trial in 1988, plaintiff developed a strict liability theory 
which was supported by facts uncovered earlier in discovery and 
by the pretrial deposition testimony of plaintiff's expert, 
Carl Eilers. Both plaintiff and defendant thereafter submitted 
jury instructions addressing plaintiff's strict liability 
theory of recovery, as well as plaintiff's negligence theory. 
See plaintiff's opening brief, pp. 3, 9-10 and Transcript, R. 
922 at 28-32 attached to plaintiff's opening brief as Addendum 
B. 
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rebut these facts. The record contains solid, mostly 
uncontradicted evidence supporting each of the four elements of 
a strict liability claim against Tel Tech: 
(1) The record establishes through Tel Tech's own 
employees (and Tel Tech admits in its brief) that the 
defendants were in the business of selling stainless steel 
dairy equipment, such as spray balls, to dairy facilities. 
Transcript, R. 925 at 132-33; R. 922 at 109; R. 924 at 48-51; 
defendant's brief, p. 7, 1f 6. 
(2) Through the testimony of Carl Eilers, plaintiff's 
expert, evidence was presented that the spray ball system sold 
and installed by Tel Tech was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous by virtue of the absence of any walk protection to 
allow the user to safely operate the spray balls. Transcript, 
R. 922 at 28-40. 
(3) Through the testimony of Robert Conger, the 
record stands undisputed that the product reached Conger 
without any substantial change in its condition. Transcript. 
R. 925 at 161-68, 228-32. 
(4) Through the testimony of Mr. Conger and Carl 
Eilers, solid evidence was presented that the defective 
condition, namely, the absence of walk protection, caused 
Conger's injury, and that had suitable walk protection been 
supplied with the spray ball system, Conger's injury likely 
would not have occurred. Transcript, R. 922 at 207. 
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Thus, all of the elements of strict liability as set 
forth in Ernest W. Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 
(Utah 1979), and its progeny, have been satisfied. Tel Tech's 
brief is notable due to the absence therein of any facts or 
arguments rebutting the state of the record on this point. 
Recognizing the fact that plaintiff established a 
prima facie case of strict liability, Tel Tech strains to 
reclassify plaintiff's claims and the relevant facts to justify 
the court's erroneous exclusion of a theory of recovery which 
was supported by the evidence. Tel Tech uses essentially three 
methods to obfuscate the issues in this case: 
(1) Tel Tech claims that its actions constituted 
services, as opposed to the sale of a product, for which strict 
liability is not allowed. 
(2) Tel Tech claims, without analysis, that the many 
cases cited by Conger in his opening brief upholding similar 
strict liability claims involving the lack of safe access to or 
use of an otherwise non-defective product are somehow 
inapposite; and 
(3) Tel Tech asserts, for unexplained reasons, that 
plaintiff should be precluded from alleging both a strict 
liability and negligence claims because at the time of the 
first appeal of this matter strict liability had not been 
actively raised by the parties. 
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Conger hereafter briefly addresses each of these three 
arguments. 
II. 
TEL TECH'S CLAIMS THAT ITS PRODUCT HAD NO DEFECT, 
AND THAT IT PRIMARILY RENDERED SERVICES, ARE BELIED 
BY UNDISPUTED FACTS; THE LAW ON WHICH IT RELIES 
IS THEREFORE INAPPOSITE. 
It is undisputed that Tel Tech sold the spray ball 
system to Meadow Gold. It is also undisputed that Tel Tech was 
in the business of selling stainless steel parts and equipment, 
including spray balls, to dairies such as Meadow Gold. 
Nevertheless, Tel Tech insists on categorizing its actions as 
the rendering of services to Meadow Gold, and cites a number of 
cases confirming obvious law that strict liability does not 
apply to providers of professional services or repairers of 
products who do not sell or otherwise distribute a product. 
Tel Tech also consistently misstates Conger's strict 
liability claim, repeatedly asserting that since the spray 
balls functioned as intended, plaintiff cannot claim a defect 
in the system, and must actually be claiming improper 
installation. But, as pointed out at pages 25 and 26 of 
plaintiff's opening brief, Conger has never claimed Tel Tech's 
actual installation of the spray balls themselves was 
negligent, or that the spray balls themselves did not function 
as intended. Rather, plaintiff has always alleged that the 
failure to include walk protection in connection with the spray 
-6-
4781w 
balls constitutes negligence by Tel Tech, and the absence of 
this safeguard in the spray ball system renders the system 
unreasonably dangerous to users. 
Viewing plaintiff's claims for what they are, as 
opposed to defendant's strained misrepresentation, the cases 
relied upon by Tel Tech are easily distinguishable. Davis v. 
Pacific Diesel Power Co., 598 P.2d 1228 (Ore. App. 1979) does 
not support Tel Tech's position. In Davis, a fire in a 
compressor occurred when an automatic shutdown system failed to 
engage. The defendant in Davis, Pacific Diesel Power Company, 
had sold to plaintiff's employer a rebuilt diesel engine which 
defendant installed in the employer's compressor. The court 
granted the defendant's motions to strike the strict liability 
counts because the plaintiff, contrary to Conger, "did not 
contend that the product sold to [plaintiff's employer] by the 
defendant, the rebuilt engine, was defective." .Id. at 1233. 
Rather, the complaint alleged that the compressor unit into 
which the rebuilt engine was installed was defective. The 
court noted that this was the same argument rejected in Hoover 
v. Montgomery-Ward, 528 P.2d 76 (Ore. 1974), a case which the 
trial court and defendant relied on below and which plaintiff 
has distinguished in his opening brief at pages 17 through 19. 
In both Davis and Hoover, the plaintiff attempted to claim that 
because of the installation of a particular part into another 
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product which had not been sold by the defendant, the entire 
product became defective. The plaintiff in both cases, 
however, lacked proof that the parts sold by defendant were 
defective in some way at the time they left the defendant's 
control. Thus, these cases lacked proof of one of the 
fundamental elements of a strict liability claim. Here, 
plaintiff's evidence is not that the tanker itself was 
defective, but was that the spray ball system sold and 
installed by Tel Tech was defective due to its absence of 
safeguards allowing it to be used in a safe manner. Thus, both 
Davis and Hoover lend no support for Tel Tech's arguments. 
In a similar manner, Tel Tech also mischaracterizes 
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969). In 
Newmark, the court expressly found that strict liability was 
appropriate in a combined service and sales situation, because 
the plaintiff alleged that the product sold by the defendant (a 
permanent wave solution) was in fact defective. The only 
difference between Newmark and Conger's strict liability claims 
is that here, the nature of the defect is the absence of an 
adequate safety device supplied with the product, making the 
product dangerous to users. For purposes of the application of 
the theory of strict liability, such differences are 
irrelevant, as abundant case law demonstrates. See plaintiff's 
opening brief at pp. 19-24. 
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The additional cases cited by Tel Tech at pages 24 
through 36 of its brief likewise lend no support to Tel Tech's 
arguments in this case, since none of the cases relied on by 
Tel Tech involve the sale of a product by an entity in the 
business of selling such products, as with Tel Tech. For 
example, Lemley v. J&B Tire Co. , 426 F.Supp. 1378, 1379 
(W.D.Pa. 1977), involved a claim against private sellers of a 
used automobile and a repairman to that automobile. The court 
found there was no evidence suggested of any defects in the 
components supplied by the defendant who repaired the brakes, 
and that repair of the brakes in and of itself did not subject 
the repairman to strict liability in tort. Swenson Trucking & 
Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equipment Co., 604 P.2d 1113, 
1116 (Alaska 1980); Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 
668 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1981); Barry v. Stevens Equipment Co., 
335 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. App. 1985), and other such cases cited by 
defendant likewise involved a claim of strict liability against 
a defendant who did not sell anything to anyone, but, contrary 
to Tel Tech, simply repaired a used product. They simply agree 
with Lemley that strict liability does not apply to repairmen. 
Nastasi v. Hochman, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1977), involved 
a fire in an airplane caused by faulty installation of a strobe 
light system. The court in Nastasi found that plaintiff had 
made no allegation of any defect in the strobe light system and 
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disallowed strict liability claims. Significantly, the strict 
liability claim in this case was against the owner of the 
airplane, which was a lingerie company, and was clearly not in 
the business of selling planes or any parts involved in the 
fire. Another reason the strict liability claim was disallowed 
in Nastasi was that the court expressly found that the 
defendant owner of the plane had leased it to another company, 
and that the defendant, as a lingerie company, was not in the 
business of leasing airplanes. 
Other obviously inapplicable cases on which Tel Tech 
attempts to rely include Kaplan v. C Lazy U Ranch, 615 F.Supp. 
234 (D. Colo. 1985), involving an attempt at holding a ranch 
owner strictly liable where plaintiff fell off a horse from an 
inadequately fastened saddle; Held v. 7-Eleven Food Store, 438 
N.Y.S.2d 976 (1981), in which a patron injured on a concrete 
walkway outside the 7-Eleven store unsuccessfully alleged that 
the concrete walkway was a "product" for purposes of strict 
liability; Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 374 A.2d 1187 
(N.H. 1977), in which the injured skier alleged that the ski 
resort owner's tramway was a "product" for strict liability 
purposes. These types of cases, and others cited by Tel Tech 
in its brief simply point out the well established rule that 
strict liability does not extend to professional services 
supplied by architects, physicians, owners, and engineers, or 
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to the efforts of repairers who sell no product; rather, the 
doctrine has been limited, for the most part, to those who 
sell, lease or otherwise distribute products in their normal 
business. None of these cases lend any support to Tel Tech, 
since Tel Tech indisputably was in the business of selling 
spray ball systems. The fact that Tel Tech also installed the 
spray ball system does not prevent strict liability from 
attaching, and Tel Tech has cited no authority stating such 
proposition. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has cited cases in 
which strict liability was upheld in the context of combined 
sales and services where it is shown that the product supplied 
was in some manner defective, including where defendant's 
installation caused its product to be defective. Plaintiff's 
opening brief at pp. 26-27. 
III. 
TEL TECH HAS FAILED TO DISTINGUISH THIS CASE FROM 
WELL ESTABLISHED AUTHORITY THAT THE ABSENCE OF 
ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICES OR SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH 
A PRODUCT WHICH OTHERWISE FUNCTIONS PROPERLY 
CONSTITUTES A PROPER BASIS FOR STRICT LIABILITY. 
At page 26 of its brief, Tel Tech states "[i]f Tel 
Tech had sold spray ball parts to Meadow Gold and the parts 
themselves had been inherently defective and caused injury, 
plaintiff's claim of strict liability might have merit under 
the [Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., supra] analysis." Here again, 
Tel Tech attempts to narrowly redefine the scope of strict 
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liability. The numerous cases cited by plaintiff in his 
opening brief at pages 19-25, including Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 
714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983), applying Utah strict liability 
law, illustrate the uniform rule that strict liability attaches 
where evidence exists that a product was defective solely 
because of the absence of safety devices allowing the operator 
to safely use the product, even where the product functioned 
exactly as intended. Tel Tech has blithely claimed, without 
any analysis, that all of these cases cited by plaintiff are 
dissimilar, because they involve "original design problems of 
the entire system." But that is exactly plaintiff's claim in 
this case as well: the absence of walk protection with 
defendant's spray ball system is an original design defect in 
the entire system sold by Tel Tech which makes it unreasonably 
dangerous for the user. 
IV. 
TEL TECH'S ASSERTION THAT PLAINTIFF CANNOT DEVELOP 
AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIABILITY AFTER THIS COURT'S 
REMAND FOR TRIAL IS MERITLESS. 
While it is true that on the first appeal of this case 
before this Court, the theory of plaintiff's claim against 
defendant at that time rested in negligent performance of 
services, this fact in no way precludes plaintiff from 
thereafter proposing an alternative theory based upon strict 
liability, if facts justifying such a theory exist. Plaintiff 
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never argued before this Court originally that negligence was 
the exclusive theory of recovery;1 rather, negligence was 
simply the theory on which plaintiff based his claims at the 
time of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant has 
suggested absolutely no law supporting its position that 
plaintiff is therefore precluded from asserting at trial a 
factually-supported alternative theory of recovery in addition 
to negligence.2 Thus, defendant's argument that plaintiff's 
alternative theories at trial of strict liability and 
negligence are somehow improper or mutually exclusive lack 
substance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the briefs and the record before this court, 
it is undisputed that plaintiff established facts before the 
jury satisfying the elements of strict liability, as well as 
the elements of negligence against Tel Tech. Plaintiff has a 
right under long established law to have all theories of his 
case presented to the jury. Plaintiff is entitled to present 
1
 Even had plaintiff done so, it would be no basis for 
precluding a viable alternative theory thereafter. 
2
 Tech Tech's argument to the trial court on this point was 
based on "surprise" and the statute of limitations. 
Recognizing that neither of these had any support in the facts 
or law, defendant has abandoned them on appeal, leaving 
defendant with no legal or factual basis whatsoever for its 
present position. 
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to the jury his claim that the spray ball system was defective 
due to the absence of adequate safeguards allowing the user to 
safely operate the system, according to established law 
recognized and applied by courts around the country, including 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals based on Utah law. 
The trial court's directed verdict on the strict 
liability count should be reversed and the case should be 
remanded for trial in the manner set forth in plaintiff's 
opening brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of October, 1989. 
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